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In the Supreme C.ourt of the State of Utah 
WILLIAM N. CHRISTIANSEN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
- vs -
VINCENT L. REES, DOE I 
and DOE II, and the 
8ALT LAKE CLINIC, a 
proft>ssi on al corpora ti on, 
Def Pndants-RespondPnts. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
NATURE OF TI-rn~ CASE 
Case No. 
10731 
'rl1is is an action, instituted in 19G5, for medical mal-
practice in the performance of surgery in 1955, during 
\\-hich it is claimed a portion of a surgical needle was left 
in appt> llan t's body. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
A f t(~r tlrn pretrial hearing, and upon consideration 
of appdlant's deposition and the memoranda of author-
i1 i<>s submitted by counsel, the court entered a judgment 
o.f dismissal with prejudice because the action was barred 
lir the Statute of Limitations. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's statement of facts is incomplt-te, sincP 
it fails even to mention n10st of t110 fads npon 'rhich 
tlw judgment of the lower court was based. Respondent~ 
therefore now set forth additional facts, with supporting 
eitations to appellant's de110sitio.n, a eopy of which wac; 
considered by the court under stipulation by tlw partif:'~ 
(R. 9), and the original of which has since be(_'ll pnl1-
lished and made a part of the r0rord here as pagP 1-1-. 
Respondent Dr. Rees iwrforuwd snrgen· upon app1·l-
lant in 1951 and 1952 and on April 12, 1955, hP excis<'d 
a portion of appellant's rPcturn. After relt-ase frorn 
L.D.S. Hospital in Salt Lake City, appellant n•turned to 
his home in ~f ayfiPld, Utah, and rn'ver again communi-
cated with Dr. Rees or his associates (Deposition 9, 10. 
11, 14). Appellant's post-operative medical can' wa~ 
rendered by Dr. Davidson, a physician practicing i11 
central Utah. 
There has been no doctor-patient relationship or 
communication beween appellant and rPspondents sinel' 
the hospital discharge in April J953 (Deposition i.J:), 
From the tinw of the o.perntion of April, 19G5, until 
at least the date of his deposition, N overnber 11, 1%5, 
appellant has had a continuing pain near the anus an<l 
tail born'. There has been no change in tht> location 
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111' natun~ o.f the pain (Deposition 12, 13, 22). It covers 
an an·a of about one inch or a little more and appellant 
l'Hn frel pain at tlw same point each time he sit::; flat or 
so that the arPa is being pressed, and he can feel pain 
at tlH• same point if he presses it \vi th his fingers (Depo-
::;it ion 12, 13, 38, 42). It is a steady, constant pain, which 
appellant has experienced "through the ten years smce 
tlw operation" (Deposition 22). 
In Jul;·, l 962, seven y<>arn after the operation, the 
eamw of the pain \\·as diagnosed as a small pirce of a 
;;urµ;ical ncedle in the appellant's hody which the appel-
lant nm,- alleges was lrft thPn' during the 1955 operation. 
Tlw long period o.f time \Yhich elapsed from the oper-
;dion to the time the ne<>dle was discovt'I'ed was drn• to the 
fad that tlt1• ap1wllant rnacle no significant effort to 
diseo,ver thP m)PClle in spite of thP fact that he exper-
i1·n(·Pd continuous pain at the point of the incision. He 
a,:kpd Dr. Davidson about it "on and off" and described 
to him thP pain "and all about it" (Deposition 19). He 
1wv1'!' rdnrnPd to the respondent's office or call<•<l or 
11 rntr• to complain o.f the pain or to attempt to discover 
its eans<> (Deposition pp. 13-1+, +-±), even though lw has 
1·n11H' to the Salt Lake ar<'a at lc)ast once a ;-ear ever sincP 
t\1p op<·1·ntion (DPpoRition p. -1--1-). 
'L'l1c• appellant sought medical assistance only in n'-
L'.<ll'11 to unrdatPd nih1wnts, so that an)· refrrencP to the 
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pain was casual or incidental to the main purpos0 o,f th(" 
visit. The only physicians he saw during tlw ReVPn yPar 
period were Drs. Stewart, Endsley, Rurnel, Vilrn and 
Davidson (Deposition, p. 23). He saw Dr. Rtcwart for 
a lung condition (Deposition, p. 16), Dr. Endsley wa~ 
consulted for a kidney stone condition, Drs. Viko and 
Rumel were seen in regard to a chest condition (Deposi-
tion, p. 23), and the appellant's family physician, Dr. 
Davidson, was consulted after the short period of post-
operative care only in regard to a kidney stone condition 
(Deposition, p. 17), and the pain was mentioned to Dr. 
Davidson only casually and not upon every visit (Deposi-
tion, pp. 19, 44). Thus, if it were not for th0se otlwr 
ailments, the needle would remain undiscovere<l as its 
discovery was incident to the kidney stone condition 
(Deposition, p. 15). The casual manner in ·which tht> 
pain was mentioned was undoubtedly a great factor in 
not creating the alarm on the part o.f these doctors to 
lead them to take the necessary steps to discover tlw 
needle at an earlier date. 
The lack of concern on the part of the appellant in 
discovering the needle was despite the fact that he exper-
ienced continuous pain which was fixed in the area of 
the operation (Deposition, p. 13). The appellant's testi-
mony in regard to the seven-year delay in discovering tlw 
needle is as follmvs (Beginning at Page 19 of his <lPpo:-:i-
tion) : 
"A. I asked Davidson on and off if it would get 
better. He said that as time went on it should, 
hut it has not. 
Q. Did you clf~scrihe to him the pain and all 
about it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did he ever suggest to you that you go back 
to the Salt Lake Clinic and complain about it 7 
A. No. 
Q. Or hack to Dr. Hees and complain about it~ 
A. No. 
Q. It is your memory of this chain of events, 
that this pain first became noticeable to you, 
the pain in your sit down area someplace, 
became noticeable to you after the 1955 oper-
ation"? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You never had it before? 
A. No. 
Q. And after the bandages were no longer needed 
to be changed, and -the rectum incision had 
healed, then you felt this pain from that time 
forward'? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. When several months went by and it didn't 
heal, and you had the pain all along, you 
decided then there must be something wrong-, 
but you didn't know what it was, is that it? 
A. That is it. 
Q. You didn't make complaint to Davidson about 
that for a year or more~ 
A. I've always complained that there was pain 
there. 
Q. Did he examine the area~ 
A. He would feel over it, look at it, but he never 
took x-rays. 
Q. And you never, to repeat again, you nevPr 
either wrote, phoned or went in personally 
to the Salt Lake Clinic or Dr. Rees to com-
plain about this pain that didn't go awa"d 
A. No, I didn't." 
Later, near the end of his deposition, appellant was 
asked, and he testified, beginning at Page 42, as follows : 
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''Q. Now in the period from 1955 up to the time 
that you filed the suit, as I understand your 
testimony, you have had throughout that per-
iod this pain that is actually in your sit-down 
area or seat, and you have told me covers an 
area of about one inch or more that you, 
yourself, can feel if you press on it, is that 
true? 
A. That is trne. 
Q. Now why not between the period o.f 1955 and 
'62, when the thing was continuing to bother 
you, why didn't you go hack to the man that 
operated on you? 
A. "Well, we had our doctor down there and we 
consulted him, not maybe every time we were 
there about it, but I thought that would be 
sufficient. 
Q. And that would be Dr. Davidson? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were you sEmt to Dr. Davidson by Dr. Rees? 
A. No, he asked who the family doctor was at the 
time. 
Q. He wanted somebody to he able to change 
the bandages? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Did you ever intend to bring this matter nf 
this continued pain over the one-inch area or 
whatever the area is in, to Dr. Rees' att<.·n-
tion but you never got around to it1 
A. As I told you before, I never seen Dr. Rees 
from the time I left his office until this dafr. 
Q. Did you have in mind to do that, bnt just 
never got around to doing it? 
A. Well, when you are out like we are you don't 
have that privilege every day, to contact them 
and ask them that question. 
Q. Are you telling me that in seven years, in a 
seven-year period, you never went hack to 
Salt Lake City? 
A. Yes, I was there. 
Q. In the periods I spoke about \Vere you there 
at least once a year~ 
A. I imagine. 
Q. 
A. 
Did you ever apply for an appointnwnt at tlw 
clinic to see Dr. Rees in that period from 
1955 to 1962 about the pain in your sPat, the 
period of seven years 0? 
No." 
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'l'here is no explanation or reason advanced in the 
record for the three-year delay, after discovery of the 
nePdlP, before the suit was filed. The total time since 
tlw alleged negligent act and the time the appellant 
filP<l the suit is 1014 yPars. 
ARGUMENT 
THI£ TRIA:L COURT ·w AS CORRECT IN 
DISMISSING THE APPELLANT'S ACTION 
BECAUSE IT IS BARRED BY THE STAT-
UTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
The development of the law on the question of when 
thP statute of limitations begins to nm in a malpractice 
adion can he easily followed hy rpference to the annota-
tions in 74 A.L.R. 3Hl ( 1931) ; 1-t4 A.L.R. 209 ( 194-3) ; 
SO A.L.R. 2d 370 (1961). These annotations reveal that 
thP general rule in the United States is that the statute 
of limitations begins to run in malpractice actions from 
the time of the negligent act. There are two generally 
n~cognized exceptions to this general rule: ( 1) if negli-
gt•nt treatment continues after the negligent act that 
directly caused the damage, the statute does not begin 
to run until the treatment terminates; (2) if the defend-
ant know::-; of the damage caused by his own negligence, 
and ath'mpts to conceal it from tlw plaintiff, or affirm-
atiwly misleads the plaintiff, the statute is tolled during 
tlw period of the fraud. 
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Neither of the above exceptions to the genral rule is 
involved in the instant case. The annotations point ont 
a minority rule, represented by the California cases cited 
in the appellant's brief, that the statute of limitations 
doPs not begin to run until the damage is discovered by 
the plaintiff. 
Utah has clearly rejected the California discovery 
rule and has followed the viFw of the majority of juris-
dictions. In Passey v. Budge, 85 Utah 37, 38 P.2d 712 
(1934), the d1:>fendant had negligently left a piece of metal 
in the plaintiff's throat during a tonsilk•ctomy. 'l'hP 
doctor-patient relationship continued up until two years 
before the plaintiff commenced suit. Howev0r, thP Court 
found that the purpose of the plaintiff's co.ntinuing visits 
to the def Pndant's office had no connPction with tlw 
throat condition. The plaintiff did not discovPr the ron-
dition until 1932, which was 7 years aftc>r the operation. 
Upon appeal, plaintiff argu0d that thP four-year 
statute of limitations did not bar the action since the 
statute did not begin to run until the doctor-patient re-
lationship had terminated. The Court recognized tli<> 
validity of the "continuing treatment" exception to tlw 
general rule, but held that since the continuing treat-
ment did not relate to any of the df ects of the metal 
object, the statute commenced to run from the time of 
the operation. Hence, the Supreme Court held that the 
statute of limitations was not tolled during the time that 
the plaintiff was unaware of his elaim. 
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In I'etdcr v. Robison, 81 Utah 535, 17 P.2d 244 
( 19:-32), the Utah Supreme Court applied the continuing 
tl<'atment exception, and thus found the statute to he no 
bar to the action. However, by way of dictum, the court 
stated: 
"Had we a case where the only negligence 
allt>g0d was the negligt>nt and unskillful operation 
in removing the tonsils, and nothing more, let it 
lw assumed that thP ranse of action ac('rued at the 
tinw of the commiss:on and completion of such 
operation, and, if an action has0d on such negli-
gPncP alone \\'as not comm<>ncPd within fonr years 
tlwreafter, the har of th0 statut<~ would lw eom-
pldt>, though thP consequential damages or in-
jUJriPs resulting from such negligencp were not 
ascertained or 1nade manifest until after tlw stat-
ute had run." 
AppPllant attPrnpts to avoid thP eff Pct of Passey v. 
Budge by contending the opinion of tlw Court on the 
statntP of limitations problern was mere> ol1iter r?icturn. 
ThP reporkd dPcision contradicts appellant's contention. 
Plain ti ff-appdlant in that case arg1wd only two points: 
First, that th<> trial eourt erred in holding that "the 
(•ansp of art ion was barr0d by thP statnt<> of limitations" 
nrnl, SPcond, that it was error to hold the evidence was 
iw:uffic·i<•ut as a matter of law (38 P.:?d at page H, first 
<'oh1111n). Tlw Supr0mP Court, in thosP portions of its 
11pinions found on pages 714--717, din•ctly discnss<>d tlw 
limitations issued and r0jPrtPd tlw ap1wllant's claim of 
1·r1·nr. SPP pag<> '717. 
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Appellant here attacks also the Peteler case upon 
the same ground - that its language on the limitation 
issue was only dicta. Again, the Suprem(• Court itsp]f 
disagrees. In P(l;ssey v. Budge, the Conrt ref0rrPd to thr 
language of the Peteler case on the limitation isstw as 
"the doctrine o.f the PetelE>r v. Robison" case, and statPd 
that the "principle of law laid down in that case is cor-
red." (Page 717, first column, in 38 P. 2d.) 
Neither of these cases has rJPen overruled or modi-
fied by the Supreme Court. The facts and principles of 
Passey v. Budge are strikingly similar to the case at 
bar, and while appellant asks, in the name of "suhstan-
tial justice" that he be allowed to submit his cast> to a 
jury, the Supreme Conrt, in Passr>y, clearly statf>d: 
"lt must be remembered that the statut<> of 
limitations is a legal, and not an equitable, <lP-
fense. It is availablf~, regardless of equities, if 
the facts are such as to warrant the inteq)osition 
o.f the plea." 
E-ven if the equities \Vere to be considered, they are in 
favor of the respondent, Dr. Rees. Substantial justict' 
should not require a person to def end a claim which is 
more than 10 years old and which has run two and one-
half times the limitation period. This is esp<>eially true 
in the circumstances of this casP wh0re tlw delay eo.uld 
have been prevented by the exercise of even a slight 
degree of diligence on th<> part of tlw ap1wllant. 
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The appellant argues that this Court should defer 
to tlH' views of the California court and reverse its pres-
ent position. However, as is cl<>ar from the latest annota-
tion, 80 A.L.R 2d 3G8, the position of California among 
tlw jnrisdictions ruling on the question is unique, to the 
(:;dent that there is a section in the annotation, at page 
390, headed "California Rule.'' 
:\foreowr, the very cases cited by appellant from 
California, and otlwrs not cited, recognize that even 
if a plaintiff has not discov<>red that he has a cause of 
ar~tion, the statute will neverthelPss start to run if the 
plaintiff has knowledge of facts l\'hich should put him 
<111 inquir>' as to tlu' f'XistPnce of a cause of action. 
Ilw;trative is Stafford v. Sliiiltz, 259 P.2d 494 (Calif. 
1952), in which the defendants negligPntly treated plain-
tiff's lPg, causing serious infection which eventually re-
;.:nlt<>d in amputation of th<> leg. The neglig('nt acts 
occmTPd long befon" the one-year period of the Cali-
fornia statute of limitations. The plaintiff had knowl-
Pdge of the deteriornting condition of his leg more than 
<11w >-ear ht>fore snit was fik'd, hut d;d not learn that 
the defondant's negligence was the cause of this condi-
tion until a lakr date which was within the one year 
11<'riorl of the California statute. The California District 
Court of Appeal held that the statutP began to nm from 
the tinw that the plaintiff kne1y of the condition of his 
l<'µ;, i-;ince that knowledge should havu put him on inquir:v 
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as to any possible claim against the def 0ndant. HencP, 
the suit was barred, and demurrers to th0 complaint 
were properly sustained, despite the fact that the plain-
tiff was actuall>- unaware of his claim. 
On appeal to the Supreme Court of California, thP 
principle upon which the ruling was based ·was upheld 
hut the Supreme Court reversed the decision upon tlw 
ground that the complaint nndPr attack alleg<~d fraud 
and misreprPsentation by the dPfondants, which allega-
tion presentPd "sufficient facts to toll the statute of 
limitations.'' Stafford v. 8l111ltz (Calif. 195-t), 270 P. 2d 1. 
In its decif'ion, the SuprPme Court of California ex-
prPssly rPeognizPd that, ahs0nt other considerations such 
as the allPgation of fraud and misrepresentation, the 
statute runs from the date of the negligent act. This 
year, that court relied upon Stafford v. Shultz in deciding 
an action for legal malprnctire. Alter 11s. "11 ichacl (Calif. 
1966), 413 P.2d 153. 
In Hurlimann v. Bank of America National Trust 
& Savings Association, 297 P.2d 682 (Calif. 1956), thr 
court stated that a plaintiff, in order to benefit by thP 
California discovery rule, must show that he is not at 
fault for not making an earlier discovery of his claim, 
and that he had no knowledge of facts that should havP 
put him on inquiry. Other jurisdictions whieh follow 
the California rule also rPquire that the plaintiff show 
that he had no knowledgP of facts that should have put 
15 
him on inquiry as to any possible claim~1 d~ages. 
E. G. Hahn v. Claybrook{tdlOO Atl. 83 (~af 4965); ~.2 pQ/ {~-<.. Weinstein v. Blanchard, Atl. ~ (N.J. ). Appel-
lant has made no such showing by his pleadings or 
tPstlmony in this case. 
The Montana case cited by appellant, Johnson v. St. 
Patrick's Hospital, 417 P.2d 469 (Montana 1966), and the 
commentary on the case quoted by appellant in his 
hrief, clearly qualify the discovery rule, limiting its 
application to siutations where the plaintiff was diligent 
in his attempts to discover his injury. 
It is thus clear that in cases in which courts have 
applied the discovery rule and tolled the statute, the 
plaintiff involved either alleged exceptions to the gen-
rral rule or that he was diligent in discovery and prose-
cuting his cairn. Hmvever, in the instant case, the plain-
tiff made no effort to find the cause of the pain which 
he experienced after the 1955 operation. The pain was 
constant, it was in a small area, it did not shift its 
location, and appellant never had it before. Despite all 
this, the pain was mentioned only incidentally in connec-
tion with treatment for other unrPlated ailments. Al-
though he had ample opportunity, he made no attempt to 
see the respondent or to take any o.thPr action to ascer-
tain the problem. 
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Had the appellant made any real effort to discowr 
the source of his pain, or had he brought it to the atten-
tion of the respondent, his cause of action would almost 
certainly have been discovc'rc>d within th<> four ~-ear lim-
itation period. 
1The latest California cases rPspondents have het•n 
able to find reaffirm the proposition that the plaintiff 
may still be barred, despite the "California rule", if he 
knows facts which would reasonably put him on notice of 
inquiry. See opinions of Supreme Court of California 
in Stafford v. Shultz, 270 P.2cl 1, cikd in Thompson 1·. 
Fresno, 381 P.2d 92-t 
Plaintiff also cited Arizona and Colorado cases to 
support his position. However, it should he noted that 
neither of the cases cited from these jurisdictions adopt 
the California rule. The cases were decided under tlw 
exceptions to the majority rule. In Rosane v. Sc11gcr, 
149 P.2d 372 (Colo. 1944), the court found that thl' 
defendant had fraudulently conC('aled his nPgligence fr0111 
the plaintiff, and on this ground held the statuk had 
no·t commenced to run. Similar grounds were the basis 
of the Arizona decision in Morrison 1!. Action, 198 P.2d 
590 (Ariz. 1948). 
Furthermore, it has heen held that the doctrine of 
laches may prf'rlucle rerovel)- in spit<> of the adoption of 
the California rule. The Supreme Court of Idaho ap-
17 
parently adopted the California discovery rule in Billings 
v. Sisters of lllercy of Idaho, 389 P.2d 224 (Idaho 19G-!). 
It is note>d, howeve>r, the Idaho court specifically ruled 
that failure to use due diligence, after being put on 
notice of facts which should incite inquiry, might haT 
tlw claim. Later, in a federal diversity case, thP :Ninth 
Circuit interpTeted the Idaho Court as adopting the 
discovery rule with some reservation. The Federal Court 
held that a daim which was nine years old may he barred 
hy t!te doctrine of laches, in spite of the fact that during 
the nine years the plaintiff was unaware of his claim. 
Owens v. White, 342 F.2d 817 (9th Circuit 1965). 
In the instant case, actual discovery was made in 
19G2, and suit was filed more than three years lateT. 
'l'lrns, tlw rlaim was more than h'n yt>ars old at the time 
t!te suit was file>d, and tlwrefore, even unde>r the dis-
covery rule, the equitable doctrine of lnches should bar 
this suit. 
'l'he pntire> issut> involved in the instant case may be 
dispos<•d of by reference to the Utah statutes. The issue 
involved arises because of the appellant's argument that 
tlwrp is no designation in our statutes as to when the 
fom yPar limitation period of St>ction 78-12-25 should 
lwgin to run. However, a carPful n'ading of the code 
n·wals that there is such a d<~signation. Utah Code 
Nection 78-12-1 prt>scribes that thP various limitation 
pniods stated throughout Chapter 12 of Title 78 shall 
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commence to run "after the cause of action shall hav" 
accrued ... " The Supreme Court of Karn~as has ron-
strued identical statutory language to iiwan that tli1• 
limitation periods must run from tllP datP of tlw negli-
gent ruct, precluding the court from designating any other 
point of time. Hill v. Hayes, 395 P.2d 298 (Kansas 19G-t). 
The legi:-;lative history of the statute of limitatiom 
provision applirahle in the instant ca~-w is enlightc>ning-
on this problem. Prior to 1951 the personal injury statutP 
of limitations provided that: 
.. An action for rt>lief not otlterwii'w proviclPd 
for mnst he commenced within the four y<>ar' 
after the eaus(' of action shall have accnwd.'' 
Tith~ 104-2-30, Utah Code Annotated J 9-!-:3. 
In 1951 tlw Legislature enarted what is called th1• ·•ju-
dicial code" in which Title 10-i, among others, was n'-
pealed and the present statute was Pnacted. In vlace of 
the section quoted abow, the Legislature provided that 
there must be instituted \vithin four years "an action 
for relief not otherwise provided for by la\\·." Othl'r 
sections of the statutes of limitation \YPre not ehanged. 
An examination of these other statutes reveals siw-
cific instancc>s wlwre the legi::;Jatun-- has provided that 
the statute of limitations dol's not run until th<' vlaintiff' 
discovers the facts whieh giye rise to his cause of action. 
SPe 'J'itle 78-1:2-2(). The first :-;1•etion of that statute pro-
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vidPs that the cause of action for damages for injury 
to n~al property "shall not be deemed to have accrued 
until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts 
constituting such waste or trespass." 
The next section of 78-12-26 provides the cause of 
adion does not accrue until the owner of the livestock 
in question "has actual knowledge of such facts as would 
put a reasonable man upon inquiry ... " 
It is interesting to note that the legislature did not 
makP any provision for either actual discovery or "due 
diligence" in the four-year statute governing personal 
injury actions. The failure of the legislature so to do 
has been held to be significant by the Supreme Court 
of New Mexico in the malpractice case of Roybal v. 
White, 383 P.2d 250 (1953), where the court held that 
since the legislature enacted a discovery rule to apply 
in some circumstances, the courts are not free to apply 
a similar rule in other circumstances where the legis-
lature chooses not to. act. The court said: 
"\Ve cannot supply what the legislature has 
omitted. We are convinced that if the legislature 
had intended the principle of discovery to apply 
to tort actions, it would have specifically so pro-
vided, as it did with regard to discovery in cases 
of fraud and in actions for injuries to or conver-
sion of pro1wrty." 
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The same result was reached in a case involving a spong-1· 
left in a patient in Lindquist v. Mullen, 377 P.2d 7l~ 
(Wash. 1954), and in a case involving negligent trc>at-
ment of a shoulder condition in Hill 11• Hays, :195 P.2rl 
298 (Kan. 1964). 
The rulings of the above cases have been adopted, 
m principh•, hy the Supreme Court of Utah in its 19011 
decision of Auerbach v. Samnels, 349 P.2d 1112, in which 
the plaintiff sought to avoid the effect of limitations in 
an attempt to establish a constructive trust for unpaid 
legacies claimed under a will. Citing 'J'itle 78-12-2(i, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, the Suprenw Court affirnw1l 
a lower court dismissal of the action and hPld that in 
the absence of extrinsic fraud, the statute of limitation~ 
runs from th<' time of the distribution of the <·stak 
The court conclud0d: 
"Even under the plaintiffs' theory of wron;;-
ful distribution and constructive trust, the period 
within ·which an action must be commenced begin:.: 
to run from the time the person entitled to tlw 
property knows, or by reasonalJle diligence awl 
inquiry should know, the r<~levant facts." (Em-
phasis supplied.) 
The appellant attempts to avoid the holding of the 
Roybal, Lindq1.tist, Hill and Auerl;ach cases by citinp; 
Att.orney Genrral v. Pomeroy, 93 Utah 42G, 73 P.2d 1271 
(not 73 Utah 4G, 72 P.2d 1277 as cited by the aprwllant), 
as standing for the proposition that tlw Court may ignor1• 
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the ah:wnce of a discovery rule in a statutory provision 
ilnd snperimpose its own views in place of the missing 
language. However, the case in no way supports the 
aprwllant's contention. The case mPrely holds that the 
statuk is tolled if the defendant conceals the cause of 
action from the plaintiff. 'The case is in accord with the 
wrll-established exceptions to the general rule in mal-
practi<·P eases and is not involvt>d in the instant case. 
11he appellant argues that despite the fact that the 
lq.('islaturP enactt>d a discovery rule in some of the time 
lirnitation statutes hut failPcl to do so in the applicable 
statute, the legislature nevertheless intends the discovery 
rnlP to apply. Tht> argumt'nt is based on conjecture, and 
is eontrary to the Pstablished principles of statutory 
construction. 1 t is well established that where a par-
tienlar provision is contained in one portion of the code 
and is ahs~mt in another, the lt>gislature intended to ex-
<'lnd<' it from thP latter statute. Costello v. Farrrll, 48 
N.W. 2d 557 (Minn. 1951); Blackeslee Storage W(lre-
lwuses, Inc. vs. City of Chicago, 17 N.E. 2d 1 (Ill. 1938). 
l<'urth<>rrnore, when a statute has a long and consistent 
construction by the courts, the failure of the legislature 
to aJt<>r thP statute to preclude the construction is evi-
denee that it acquiesces in the construction. Alexander 
1. Be11J1ctt, 5 Utah 2d 163, 298 P.2d 823, cc>rt. denied, 353 
lT.~. D23 (195G); Da~iis v. Nru' York (!entral Railroad, 
117 N.K 2d 39 (Ohio 1954); Fehr 1.-. General Accident 
Fire and Life Assurance Corp., lG N.W. 2d 787 (Wisc. 
19-1-1:). 
2~ 
The limitation applicable in the instant case, Utah 
Code Annotated 78-12-25 (1953), ·was amended in l~JjJ 
without adding any provision for a discovery rule. t-lPt 
Laws of Utah, 1951, Chapt<'r 58, SPction 3. It is estah 
lished that when the legislature amends or re-Pnaet, 
legislation using similar wording, it is implied that tlw 
legislature intends to aic:cept the prior construction uf 
the portions of the statute which are effectively n-
tained. Anderson v. Cook, 102 Utah 2(i5, 130 P.2d 2/-: 
(1942); Jlfasich v. United States 8mclti11g, Refini11,r1 & 
Mininq Co., 113 Ptah 101, 191 P.2d 612 (19+8). 
CONCL(TSfON 
It is graphically clear from appellant's own testi-
mony that for more than ten years prior to the filing 
of this suit, he had a problem of continuing pain, in a 
small area which he could touch with his finger, that wa' 
in the area of the operation in question, that he harl 
ample opportunity to take action concerning it, but that 
he simply failed to do anything about it. Even aftec 
disco:vering the presence of the broken surgical need!•· 
in 1962, appellant did not file this suit until three mor" 
years had passed. 
Under such circumstances, it is abundantly apparent 
that, even under the more liberal rule followed by sorn1• 
states, appellant should be barred from 1iroceeding witl1 
this action, and since the only Utah authority in point. 
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tlw casP of Passey v. Budge, holds clearly that the statute 
of limitations has run, the judgment of the lower court 
\ras co1TPct and it sl1ould bP affirm Pd. 
Respectfully submitted, 
.JOHN H. SNO"W 
Attorney for Def en(lwnts-
Respondents 
701 Continental Bank Bldg. 
8alt Lake City, Utah 
